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SPEECH 


OF 


HON.  T.  L.  CLINGMAN,  OF  N.  C, 


IN  FAVOR  OF 


HIS  PROPOSITION  FOR  A  MEDIATION  IN  THE  EASTERN  WAR. 


DELIVERED 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES,  JANUARY  3,  1855. 


h  J 


op  co/@s 


7     U.S.A. 

Washington  : 

DA?  Ttfv  CONGRESSIONAL  GLOBE  OFFICE. 
1855. 


/ 


N    It 


(.< 


MEDIATION  IN  THE  EASTERN  WAR. 


The  House  being  in  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole  on  the  state  of  the  Union — 

Mr.  CLINGMAN  said: 

Mr.  Chairman:  I  will  ask  the  attention  of  the 
committee,  not  to  the  subject  upon  which  my 
friend  from  South  Carolina  [Mr.  Keitt]  has  bo 
eloquently  addressed  the  committee,  for  I  should 
not  like  to  attempt  to  glean  in  a  field  which  he  has 
reaped  so  carefully,  but  to  another  question  which 
has  some  intrinsic  merits,  and  which  I  hope  to  be 
able  to  present  in  the  interval  that  will  elapse  prior 
to  the  usual  time  of  adjournment. 

It  will  be  recollected  that,  at  an  early  day  of  this 
session,  1  offered  a  proposition,  suggesting  the 
propriety  of  this  Government  offering  its  media- 
tion to  the  belligerent  Powers  of  Europe.  The 
following  is  the  proposition,  as  modified  by  me: 
A  Joint  Resolution  requesting  the  President  to  tender  the 

mediation  of  the  United  States  to  the  Powers  engaged  in 

the  Eastern  war. 

Whereas,  the  people  of  the  United  States  see,  with  re- 
gret, that  several  of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe  are  engaged 
in  a  war  which  threatens  to  be  of  long  duration,  and  disas- 
trous in  its  consequences  to  the  industrial  and  social  inter- 
ests of  a  large  portion  of  the  civilized  world  ;  and  being, 
under  the  favor  of  Providence,  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  the 
blessings  of  peace,  distant  from  the  theater  of  conflict,  dis- 
connected with  the  causes  of  quarrel  between  the  parties 
belligerent,  and,  as  a  nation,  having  no  immediate  interest 
in  the  contest,  and  no  purpose  to  interfere,  forcibly  or  in 
an  unwelcome  manner,  nevertheless  are  of  opinion  that 
the  controversy  may  be  susceptible  of  pacific  adjustment, 
through  the  interposition  of  a  neutral  and  friendly  Power : 
Therefore — 

Be  it  resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assem- 
bled, That  we  would  view  with  satisfaction  a  tender  to  the 
belligerents  of  the  mediation  of  the  United  States,  provided 
it  should  be  in  accordance  with  the  President's  views  of 
the  public  interests. 

My  object  at  that  time  was  simply  to  get  the 
subject  before  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs, 
of  which  I  am  known  to  be  a  member,  leaving  it 
to  the  discretion  of  that  committee  to  act  upon  it  as 
to  them  might  seem  best.  Since  then,  there  has 
been  a  great  deal  of  comment  upon  that  subject  by 
the  press  generally.  The  proposition  has  been 
assailed  in  some  quarters,  and  defended  with  abil- 


ity in  others.  The  course  of  remark  has  been 
such,  that  I  desire  to  make  a  short  explanation  of 
my  views  in  relation  to  this  subject,  and  of  the 
reasons  which  governed  me  in  making  the  move- 
ment. 

I  do  not  propose  to  speak  as  a  member  of  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  now,  because  I 
have  not  the  right,  under  the  rules  of  the  House, 
to  refer  to  anything  which  occurs  in  the  commit- 
tee until  it  shall  think  proper  to  make  a  report  to 
the  House.  I  desire  only  to  meet  some  of  the 
objections  which  doubtless  induced  gentlemen  to 
vote  against  the  proposition  at  the  time  when  it 
was  first  moved. 

It  is  said,  in  the  first  place,  by  objectors,  to  be 
an  intervention  on  our  part  with  the  affairs  of 
foreign  Governments.  If  it  be  intervention,  it  is 
precisely  such  intervention  as  this  Government  has 
practiced  from  its  foundation.  Every  Minister 
sent  abroad  is  sent  to  influence  the  action  of  some 
foreign  Government,  and  to  induce  it  so  to  regu- 
late its  action  as  to  benefit,  and  not  injure  us.  In 
point  of  fact,  we  have  ourselves  had  several 
instances  of  mediation  submitted  to  us,  which  we 
have  accepted,  thereby  admitting  that  it  was  not 
such  intervention  as  gentlemen  would  now  exclude 
us  from  offering  to  foreign  Governments.  Our 
Ministers  are  instructed  to  interfere  with  the  action 
of  foreign  Governments,  so  far  as  it  may  affeet 
us,  and  no  further;  and  hence  they  are  not  ex-, 
pected  to  look  to  the  internal  action  of  any  Gov- 
ernment, but  merely  to  its  external  relations, 
because  in  these  latter  we  ourselves  have  an 
interest.  For  example,  if  the  Emperor  of  Russia 
should  deprive  us  of  the  trade  of  the  ports  of  the 
Black  Sea,  or  Baltic,  our  Minister,  Mr.  Seymour, 
would  be  instructed  to  remonstrate  against  it.  If 
that  interruption  should  arise  from  a  conflict  be- 
tween Russia  and  some  other  Power,  why  then 
we  might  appeal  to  both  of  the  belligerent  parties. 
In  this  particular  instance,  our  trade  is  interrupted 
in  those  seas  by  the  existing  war,  and  our  Gov- 
ernment has  a  right  to  relieve  us  from  such  an 
injury,  if  it  is  practicable  for  it  to  do  so. 

A  gentleman  over  the  way  said,  the  other  day, 


yrl 


J 


when  I  first  brought  up  this  proposition,  that  he 
hoped  that  the  war  between  Russia  and  the  allied 
Powers  would  continue  for  fifty  years.  I  take  it 
for  granted  that  he  did  not  express  this  benevo- 
lent wish  [a  laugh]  from  any  opinion  that  it  was 
advantageous  to  the  parties  engaged  in  it;  but  he 
must  have  made  the  remark  to  carry  the  impres- 
sion that  the  United  States  would  derive  some 
advantage  from  it.  It  will  be  conceded,  on  all 
hands,  that  it  will  give  us  no  glory  and  no  addi- 
tional territory.  If  we  are  to  be  benefited,  there- 
fore, it  must  be  in  a  pecuniary  point  of  view, 
either  by  increasing  our  exports,  that  is  to  say, 
exhancing  the  value  of  what  we  have  to  sell,  or 
diminishing  the  price  of  what  we  have  to  import 
or  purchase. 

Let  us  examine  this  matter  briefly,  at  the  outset 
of  the  argument,  first  with  reference  to  what  we 
have  to  sell. 

Our  principal  article  of  export  is  cotton;  and  now, 
in  the  face  of  two  short  crops,  it  is  down  to  less 
than  eight  cents.  My  own  opinion  is,  and  I  say 
it  with  deference  to  the  opinions  of  other  gentle- 
men, that  but  for  the  war,  cotton  would  probably 
be  now  worth  eleven  or  twelve  cents,  as  it  was  in 
1850  and  1851.  I  say  so,  because  the  recent 
supplies  do  not,  I  think,  bear  a  greater  ratio  to 
the  present  demand  of  the  world  than  did  the 
crops  in  the  years  referred  to.  If  so,  the  loss  on 
this  article  alone,  will  make  a  difference  of  at 
least  forty  millions  of  dollars  in  the  value  of  our 
exports;  and,  in  point  of  fact,  I  have  no  doubt 
that  the  war  makes  a  difference  of  twenty-five  to 
forty  millions  in  this  respect  alone,  besides  losses 
in  tobacco  and  other  articles.  Gentlemen  will  say 
to  me,  perhaps,  that  breadstuff's  are  increasing  in 
value,  but  they  forget  that  the  drought  of  last  year 
bo  destroyed  the  crops  in  most  of  the  grain- 
growing  States,  that  we  shall  have  nothing  to 
spare  for  the  next  twelvemonths.  We  have  then 
to  take  the  chances  of  deriving  an  advantage  two 
years  hence;  if  we  should  then  happen  to  have 
produce  to  sell,  as  a  set-off  to  the  large  and  heavy 
losses  that  are  falling  on  us. 

But,  in  point  of  fact,  it  is  the  ability  of  Europe  to 
purchase  that  determines  the  demand  for  and  price 
of  breadstuff's.  I  took  occasion  some  years  ago 
to  examine  the  reports  made  by  committees  of  the 
British  Parliament  in  relation  to  the  condition  of 
the  laboring  population  of  England.  It  appeared 
that  during  periods  of  distress  and  famine  the 
laboring  classes  were  compelled  to  give  up  in  suc- 
cession, as  the  pressure  increased,  such  articles 
as  were  not  indispensable;  and  that,  for  example, 
they  first  gave  up  sugar,  then  meat,  after  using  it 
for  a  time  only  once  a  week,  then  bread,  and  finally 
they  relied  upon  the  potato  alone.  It  appeared, 
from  the  investigation  made  at  that  time,  that  there 
was  a  disposition  to  consume  a  large  amount  of 
provisions  if  they  had  had  the  ability  to  obtain 
them.  Necessity  was  the  sole  measure  of  their 
purchases.  If  the  war  goes  on  in  Europe,  with 
its  heavy  taxation  diminishing  the  wealth  and 
means  of  the  people  there,  I  doubt  very  much 
whether  they  will  have  the  ability,  to  any  great 
extent,  to  pay  for  our  produce,  even  if  we  should 
have  a  large  surplus.  But  even  if  it  should  prove 
otherwise,  it  is  not  probable  that  this  additional 
demand  will  make  up  for  the  loss  upon  the  other 
articles  to  which  I  have  alluded. 

Again,  specie  is  being  rapidly  drawn  abroad  from 


his  country  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  belliger- 
ents. There  is,  by  consequence,  an  extraordinary 
pressure  in  the  eastern  cities,  and  extending  itself 
nto  the  interior  of  the  country,  so  as  seriously  to 
cripple  all  business  transactions,  and  produce  heavy 
losses  to  the  community.  Stocks  of  all  kinds  have 
also  greatly  fallen  in  value,  to  the  detriment  of 
many  of  the  States,  as  well  as  of  individuals.  Be- 
sides all  this,  the  shipping  interest  has  suffered, 
and  is  suffering  extremely. 

During  the  great  wars  in  Napoleon's  time, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  was  excluded 
from  most  of  the  continental  ports,  our  ships  had 
the  carrying  trade.  Such,  however,  is  not  now 
the  case;  but  there  are,  in  fact,  nearly  as  many 
foreign  ships  engaged  in  trade  as  before  the  war 
began,  owing  to  the  fact  that  Russia  has  not  the 
means  of  molesting  the  Allies  on  the  sea.  In  fact, 
while  the  number  of  carriers  remains  about  the 
same,  the  absolute  value  of  freights  is  likely  to  be 
diminished,  so  that  really  the  whole  shipping 
interest  is  languishing,  and  the  value  of  ships  is 
twenty  or  thirty  per  cent,  less  than  it  was  a  few 
months  ago.  A  gentleman  behind  me,  from  the 
maritime  region,  says  that  it  has  diminished  fifty 
per  cent.    Doubtless  he  is  right  on  this  point. 

It  is  also  probable,  if  the  war  continues  for 
years,  we  shall  suffer  as  purchasers.  It  is  true 
that  certain  kinds  of  manufactures  seem  to  have 
fallen  in  value.  It  must  be  remembered,  however, 
that  the  present  supply  was  created  for  a  state  of 
peace.  One  of  the  effects  of  a  fall  of  prices  is  to 
diminish  the  amount  produced.  It  will  also  fol- 
low, that  if  laborers  are  forced  to  serve  in  the 
armies — and  on  this  account,  and  also  by  reason 
of  exorbitant  taxation,  manufacturing  establish- 
ments are  broken  up — there  must  be  a  correspond- 
ing rise  in  the  value  of  articles  produced.  These 
are  not  new  opinions  with  me;  for  in  1850,  1  con- 
tended, while  discussing  the  tariff,  that  one  of  the 
reasons  why  manufactures  were  so  cheap,  was 
that  a  long  peace  in  Europe  had  caused  the  wealth 
and  labor,  formerly  expended  in  wars,  to  be  em- 
ployed in  production,  and  thus  brought  down  the 
prices  of  articles,  and  put  them  in  the  reach  of  a 
larger  number.  If  this  was  a  sound  argument,  as 
I  still  think,  then  the  reverse,  viz:  withdrawinglabor 
and  capital  from  production,  and  expending  it  in 
war,  will  tend  to  raise  prices  in  those  commod- 
ities. 

I  refer  to  all  these  matters  to  show  that  our 
interests  are  sufferimg  from  the  effects  of  this  war; 
how  much  it  is  not  easy  to  determine.  My  own 
opinion  is  from  fifty  to  a  hundred  millions  of  dol- 
lars a  year.  I  have  no  doubt  that  it  is  largely 
more  than  the  expenses  of  this  Governments 
Now,  if  this  be  so,  is  it  not  worth  while  to  see  if 
any  measures  can  be  devised  to  remove  the  cause 
of  such  a  loss  ? 

But  it  may  be  said  that  this  is  only  temporary, 
and  that  matters  will  soon  get  right.  On  the 
contrary,  it  strikes  me  that  these  evils  must  con- 
tinue and  be  permanent.  England  and  France 
have  already  sent  more  than  one  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  men  to  the  East.  Now  if  they  cost 
the  Allies  as  much  per  man  as  our  soldiers  did 
in  Mexico,  it  will  be  upwards  of  one  thousand 
dollars  per  man  for  a  campaign;  and  this,  in  the 
aggregate,  amounts  to  one  hundred  and  fifty  mil- 
lions. Besides  this,  they  have  already  made  an 
enormous  expenditure  of  .noney  for  the  naval 


L 


armaments,  both  forthe  Baltic  and  the  Black  seas. 
So  that  the  whole  expenditure  may  be  nearly  twice 
that  sum.  From  the  Eaglish  papers,  I  observe 
that  the  British  Government  is  about  building  a 
hundred  and  twenty  steam  gun  boats,  at  a  cost 
of  $250,000  each.  That  item  alone  will  amount  to 
$30,000,000.  The  Russian  and  Turkish  expendi- 
tures are  also  very  large,  so  that  the  entire  war 
expenses  must  reach  several  hundred  millions. 

Now  the  money  expended  in  this  manner  is  as 
completely  lost  to  the  world  as  that  invested  in 
the  Arctic  when  she  went  down  into  the  waters 
of  the  deep  sea. 

It  is  supposed  that  the  Allies  have  lost  forty  or 
fifty  thousand  men,  including  those  who  have  been 
slain  in  battle,  died  of  disease,  or  have  been  per- 
manently disabled.  The  Russian  loss  is  greater, 
especially  if  we  take  into  account  the  campaign  on 
the  Danube.  The  same  is  probably  true  of  the 
Turks.  The  loss  of  all  must  exceed  one  hundred 
thousand  men.  Now,  North  Carolina  is  an  aver- 
age-sized State,  in  population,  and  she  has  only 
one  hundred  thousand  voters.  There  has  then 
been  a  number  of  men  destroyed  as  great  or  greater 
than  all  the  voting  population  of  my  State — men 
in  the  prime  of  life,  men  selected  for  their  bodily 
vigor,  and  many  of  whom  were  men  of  intellect 
and  education.  All  these  are  swept  away.  The 
effect  of  the  war  is  far  more  disastrous  than  an 
epidemic  disease  which  sweeps  over  a  country, 
and  takes  away  a  like  number  of  men,  women, 
and  children,  indiscriminately. 

My  object  in  making  these  remarks  is  to  show 
that  an  immense  amount  of  the  wealth  of  the 
world,  and  a  very  large  number  of  producers,  as 
well  as  consumers  of  the  products  of  our  labors,  are 
annihilated.  I  hold  that  such  a  loss  is  injurious  to 
the  commercial  interests  of  every  civilized  country 
in  the  world,  and  especially  to  that  of  the  United 
States. 

To  prove  the  truth  of  this  proposition,  let  us 
suppose  the  United  States  to  be  the  only  civilized 
country  in  the  world,  and  all  the  rest  to  be  filled 
with  savages,  we  should  have  then  no  exports 
and  no  imports.  This  is  evident  as  soon  as  stated. 
As  in  that  contingency,  all  our  surplus  produc- 
tions would  perish  on  our  hands,  I  need  not  argue 
that  this  state  of  things  would  be  immensely  inju- 
rious to  us.  I  maintain  that,  as  you  destroy  the 
wealth  of  the  civilized  world  to  any  great  extent, 
you  approximate  that  condition  to  which  I  have 
alluded.  For  instance,  suppose  that  other  nations 
were  thrown  back  to  the  condition  of  things  which 
existed  twenty-five  years  ago.  We  then  sold  less 
than  thirty  millions  of  dollars  worth  of  cotton.  If 
Europe  were  in  the  same  condition  as  at  that  time, 
and  we  had  now  a  hundred  millions  to  sell,  but 
could  find  a  market  for  only  thirty  millions,  where 
should  we  find  ourselves  ?  The  extra  amount  of 
seventy  millions  would  rot  on  our  hands.  But  I 
take  the  further  position,  that  even  if  this  war,  or 
any  other  cause,  should  keep  the  rest  of  the  world 
stationary  for  the  next  ten  years,  we  should  be 
greatly  losers,  because  we  are  constantly  increas- 
ing our  productions;  and  hence,  if  there  should 
not  be  a  proportionate  increase  in  the  markets  of 
the  world,  we  should  be  losers. 

I  think,  therefore,  that  the  proposition  can  be 
maintained  as  a  sound  one  in  political  economy, 
that  you  cannot  destroy  a  large  amount  of  the 
wealth  of  the  world,  without  injury  to  us  as  a 


great  commercial  nation.  There  may  be  excep- 
tions to  this  rule  here  and  there,  but  as  a  general 
proposition,  it  holds  good.  If,  then,  the  war  be 
injurious  to  us,  financially  and  commercially,  will 
it  benefit  us  politically  ?  In  reference  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  it  is  true 
that  it  is  not  a  matter  for  us  to  interfere  with.  But 
I  may  say  that  you  could  not  change  that  balance 
of  power  without  prejudicing  us.  For  example, 
if  Russia  becomes  omnipotent,  and  crushes  the 
western  commercial  nations,  though  the  Czar 
might  himself  be  as  just  and  as  moderate  as  our 
own  Washington,  his  successors  might  not  be 
so,  and  it  is  easy  to  see  that  their  conduct  could 
change  things  to  our  injury.  If  the  Allies,  on  the 
other  hand,  should  prove  decidedly  victorious, 
their  ascendancy  might  give  them,  not  only  greater 
power,  but  also  greater  inclination  to  interfere  with 
us  on  this  side  of  the  globe.  Looking,  therefore, 
to  the  mere  question  of  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe,  you  cannot  change  it  without  putting  us 
in  a  worse  condition  than  we  now  are.  I  hope  it 
will  remain  evenly  balanced,  so  that  each  Power 
may  be  able  to  hold  others  in  check,  and  prevent 
mischief. 

But  having  barely  adverted  to  these  topics  to 
show  that  this  war  is  an  evil  to  us,  I  pass  now  to 
the  consideration  of  the  other  great  question.  Is 
there  anything  in  the  attendant  circumstances  of 
a  character  to  induce  a  belief  that  our  country 
might  exert  an  influence  to  bring  the  war  to  a 
close?  This,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  a  question  of  great 
delicacy,  as  it  involves  an  examination  of  the 
grounds  of  the  war  itself.  If  I  were  to  enter  into 
a  discussion  of  its  causes,  1  should  speak  of  things 
which  persons  in  Europe,  perhaps,  understand 
better  than  I  can  do  here.  In  the  next  place,  I  might 
get  up  such  a  debate  as  would  lead  to  a  discussion 
of  the  merits  of  the  several  contending  parties,  and 
put  ourselves  in  a  position  which  neutrals  ought 
not  to  occupy.  I  therefore  feel  the  full  force  of 
the  caution  given  by  the  old  Roman  poet,  to  those 
who  tread  on  ashes  that  may  conceal  fires  under- 
neath. Nevertheless,  I  desire  to  make  a  sugges- 
tion or  two  on  this  point. 

The  war  originally  rested  upon  a  very  narrow 
basis,  so  small  that  the  parties  themselves  did  not 
expect  it  to  produce  a  war.  This  is  clear  from 
their  procrastination  and  tardiness  in  making  ade- 
quate preparations  for  so  great  a  contest.  In  fact, 
it  was  supposed,  at  one  time,  that  they  had  settled 
the  difficulty.  The  Czar  himself  is  represented  to 
have  said  that  the  war  is  one  "  for  which,  judged 
by  its  apparent  grounds,  there  is  no  reason;  and 
it  is  contrary  to  the  moral,  industrial,  and  com- 
mercial interests  of  the  entire  world."  It  is  true, 
that  he  goes  on  to  charge  that  the  purpose  rvf  4fes 
Allies  is  to  limit  the  power  of  Russia.  Well,  if 
that  be  their  purpose,  of  course  any  offer  of  medi- 
ation from  us  would  most  probably  lead  to  no 
favorable  result.  But  I  do  not  understand  that 
the  Allies  have  planted  themselves  upon  that 
ground  as  yet.  And  even  if  they  have  for  a  mo- 
ment entertained  such  notions,  the  formidable 
resistance  they  have  met  with  when  attacking 
what  was  supposed  to  be  the  exposed  point  of  the 
Czar's  dominions,  will  go  far  to  satisfy  them  that 
it  is  not  an  easy  matter  so  to  change  the  map  of 
Europe  as  to  deprive  Russia  of  any  portion  of  her 
territory.  I  do  n  ot  believe  they  will  persist  in  any 
such  purpose.    They  are  governed  by  wise  and 


.' 


sagacious  statesmen;  and,  in  view  of  the  difficul- 
ties which  present  themselves,  I  do  not  think  they 
entertain  the  idea  that,  without  a  longer  struggle 
than  either  of  these  Governments  are  willing  to 
make,  they  can  materially  diminish  the  power  of 
Russia. 

All  history  shows  that  the  apparent  strength  of 
alliances  is  deceptive.  Where  all  the  parties  are 
acting  in  good  faith,  and  with  equal  zeal,  it  very 
frequently  happens  that,  from  the  want  of  proper 
concert  of  action,  they  fail  to  accomplish  their 
object.  All  Europe  at  one  time  assailed  France 
unsuccessfully,  and  Napoleon,  himself,  at  a  later 
day,  carried  most  of  the  European  nations  with 
him  against  Russia,  but  his  reverses  caused  Aus- 
tria and  other  Powers  to  secede  and  join  his 
enemies,  so  that  he  was  in  the  end  overwhelmed. 
I  take  it  for  granted,  therefore,  that  these  sagacious 
statesmen  will  not  rely  so  fully  on  this  alliance, 
powerful  as  it  seems  to  be,  as  to  press  the  matter 
to  the  extreme  I  have  alluded  to. 

It  does  not  strike  me,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  it  is 
the  interest  of  either  of  these  Powers  to  desire  a 
prolongation  of  the  war.  England  is  a  commer- 
cial nation.  The  English  people  are  brave,  and 
energetic,  and  patient,  and  so  long  as  their  Gov- 
ernment tells  them  it  is  necessary  to  carry  on  the 
war  they  will  submit  to  sacrifices.  But  England 
can  have  no  hope  of  acquiring  territory,  so  as  to 
compensate  her  for  these  sacrifices.  This  remark 
applies  equally  to  France.  Her  Emperor  seems 
to  have  been  directing  his  energies  of  late  very 
much  to  the  improvement  of  the  interior  of  his 
own  country,  in  all  respects,  and  to  the  beautifying 
of  Paris,  its  magnificent  capital.  I  do  not,  there- 
fore, believe  that  the  Allies  will  at  present  desire  to 
prolong  the  war.  And  very  clearly  it  cannot  be  the 
interest  of  Russia  to  have  war  rather  than  peace. 
The  Emperor  of  Russia  has  a  territory  twice  as 
large  as  that  of  the  United  States.  It  is  but 
thinly  settled,  and  the  facilities  of  communication 
between  the  different  parts  of  it  are  not  such  as  they 
should  be.  He  marches  men  a  thousand  miles 
from  Moscow  to  the  Black  Sea  or  the  Danube, 
and  they  are  decimated  two  or  three  times  over 
by  disease  and  fatigue,  ere  they  reach  the  point 
of  action.  Now,  you  and  I  know  very  well,  sir, 
that  railroads  from  Moscow  and  St.  Petersburgh 
to  the  Danube,  the  Crimea,  and  the  Caspian ,  would 
make  Russia  stronger  now  than  she  would  be  with 
the  whole  Turkish  empire  annexed,  without  these 
facilities.  I  take  it  for  granted  that  a  sagacious 
ruler,  like  the  Czar,  would  rather  improve  the 
condition  of  his  country,  in  this  respect,  than 
prolong  such  a  war.  Great  Britain  is  just  the 
reverse  of  Russia  in  this  respect;  and  by  reason 
^ef  .her  compactness,  insular  position,  and  mari- 
time supremacy,  she  is  a  formidable  antagonist  to 
any  country  under  the  sun,  having  one  league  of 
sea  coast. 

But,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  no  doubt  that  there 
were  some  mistakes  made  originally.  I  think  it 
highly  probable  that  the  parties  took  the  succes- 
sive steps  that  led  them  into  this  war  without  fore- 
seeing where  they  would  carry  them.  The  Em- 
peror of  Russia  may  not  have  expected  such  an 
alliance  when  he  took  possession  of  the  Principal- 
ities, and  the  Allies  probably  thought  he  would 
recede  when  they  made  their  demonstration.  But, 
sir,  they  have  now  placed  themselves  in  a  position 
where  neither  can  well  make  the  first  move  to- 


wards a  settlement,  without  a  sacrifice  of  pride, 
and  perhaps  of  prestige.  Their  condition  is  well 
described  by  Vattel,  in  a  few  sentences,  which  I 
will  read  to  the  committee.     He  says: 

"  Two  nations,  though  equally  weary  of  war,  often  con- 
tinue it  merely  from  the  fear  of  making  the  first  advances 
to  an  accommodation,  as  these,  might  be  imputed  to  weak- 
ness; or  ihey  persist  in  it  from  animosity,  and  against  their 
own  interests.  Then  common  friends  effectually  interpose, 
offering  themselves  as  mediators.  And  there  cannot  be  a 
more  beneficent  office  than  that  of  reconciling  two  nations 
at  war,  and  thus  putting  a  stop  to  the  effusion  of  blood. 
This  is  an  indispensable  duty  to  those  who  are  possessed 
of  the  means  of  suceeding  in  it." 

These  sentences,  Mr.  Chairman,  express  fully 
what  I  would  say  on  this  point.  But  if  the  con- 
test be  not  terminated  now,  it  must  soon  become 
a  general  European  war.  It  will  next  year  prob- 
ably get  into  Germany  and  Italy,  and  be  more 
destructive  than  the  wars  of  Napoleon,  because 
the  means  of  aggression  and  destruction  are  greater 
at  this  time  than  they  were  in  his  day.  When 
the  tri-colbred  flag  is  on  the  Danube,  or  the  Vis- 
tula, the  impetuous  glory-loving  Frenchman  will 
have  brought  back  vividly  the  recollections  of 
Marengo,  and  Jena,  and  Austerlitz,  and  Wagram. 
All  Europe  will  be  in  a  blaze,  and  the  war  will 
fall  with  destructive  and  crushing  force  on  the 
industrial  and  lower  classes,  who,  in  such  times, 
are  always  the  greatest  sufferers. 

There  are  some  who  look  with  hope  and  pleas- 
ure to  this  condition  of  things.  They  say  that 
the  Governments  will  be  overthrown ,  and  the  cause 
of  liberty  advanced.  I  have  no  doubt  but  that 
some  of  the  existing  Governments  will  be  put 
down,  but  I  do  not  concur  in  the  opinion  that 
republicanism  will  gain.  You  may  see  one 
tyrannical  Government  overthrown,  and  another, 
stronger  and  more  tyrannical,  erected  in  its  stead. 
The  only  liberty  which  is  worth  preserving,  is 
that  which  is  founded  upon  law.  And  from  the 
days  of  Julius  Caesar  down  to  the  present  time, 
"arms  and  laws  have  not  flourished  together." 
On  the  contrary,  during  military  struggles,  des- 
potism raises  its  head  and  dominates  over  the  land 
amidst  the  clangor  of  arms.  To  protect  life  and 
property,  power  must  be  given  to  the  existing 
Governments.  The  greater  the  perils  which  sur- 
round them,  the  higher  the  powers  with  which 
they  must  be  invested.  Men  will  submit  to  any 
exactions,  therefore,  to  support  vast  military 
armaments.  But  let  there  he  peace  and  security, 
and  these  very  armaments,  being  no  longer  neces- 
sary to  the  safety  of  the  State,  soon  become 
intolerable  and  will  be  discarded. 

Sir,  the  history  of  modern  Europe  sustains  this 
position.  It  was  after  a  period  of  peace  that  the 
first  French  revolution  exhibited  itself,  and  at  the 
close  of  the  long  and  desolating  wars  to  which  it 
gave  rise — I  mean  when  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
sat — liberty  lay  low  all  over  Europe.  It  was  after 
a  long  period  of  peace  that  the  revolution  of  1830 
shook  down  the  French  monarchy,  and  extended 
its  vibrations  into  distant  Poland.  It  was  after 
another  long  period  of  peace  that  the  revolution 
of  1848  blazed  out  in  France,  illuminating  Lom- 
bardy,  Italy,  and  Hungary,  until  its  light  was 
dimmed  and  extinguished  by  the  smoke  of  battle. 

Sir,  our  neighbor,  Mexico,  has  had  war  enough 
in  the  last  fifty  years  to  have  made  her  people 
the  freest  on  earth,  and  yet,  though  many  tyran- 
nical Governments  have  been  put  down  there, 


I 


./ 


the  cause  of  civil  liberty  has  not  advanced.  Nor 
has  it  in  the  South  American  States;  nor  in  the 
world  generally,  during  hostile  struggles.  What 
I  mean  to  say  is,  not  that  war  may  not  be  some- 
times necessary  to  protect  liberty,  but  I  affirm  that 
liberty  does  not  usually  spring  out  of  war;  that 
where  you  have  one  case  of  that  kind,  I  can  point 
to  a  hundred  of  a  contrary  tendency.  Looking, 
therefore,  simply  to  the  interest,  of  the  masses  of 
Europe,  I  would  rather  have  peace  than  war.  In 
peace  you  have  the  railroad  and  telegraph  and  the 
newspaper.  Every  newspaper,  and  letter,  and 
message  is  an  atom  thrown  on  the  side  of  liberty. 
You  will  find  that  as  men  become  wealthier  they 
will  become  more  intelligent  and  more  tenacious  of 
their  political  and  personal  rights. 

These  views,  Mr.  Chairman,  accord  with  our 
own  political  system.  We  have  the  smallest  army 
and  navy  of  any  of  the  great  nations,  and  our 
policy  has  been  that  of  peace,  in  the  main,  from 
the  days  of  Washington.  There  are,  too,  pas- 
sages in  our  own  history,  which  render  it  imper- 
t  ative  that  we  should  make  the  movement  which  I 
have  indicated.  It  is  well  known  that  during  our 
revolutionary  struggle,  Prance  interfered  on  our 
side,  and  ultimately  became  our  ally,  and  aided  us 
until  the  end  of  the  struggle.  But  for  that  inter- 
vention it  is  highly  probable  that  the  assembly 
which  I  am  addressing  to-day  would  not  exist. 
And,  sir,  while  alluding  to  this,  I  find  myself  un- 
expectedly in  the  presence  of  one  who  calls  up 
recollections;  I  cannot  see,  at  this  moment,  without 
emotions,  the  gentleman  on  my  left.  [Mr.  Cling- 
man  looked  atM.  Lafayette,  who  was  sitting  near 
him] 

A  Voice.    "Who  is  it?" 

It  isj  (said  Mr.  Clingman,  continuing,)  he 
whose  grandsire  is  pictured  on  that  tapestry, 
(pointing  to  the  full  length  portrait  of  the  Marquis 
de  Lafayette,  on  the  left  of  the  Speaker.)  When 
we  remember  the  past,  made  vivid  by  the  sight  of 
that  picture  and  this  living  representative,  is  there 
one  who  can  doubt  but  that  we  owe  a  deep  debt  of 
gratitude  to  France.  While  I  would  not  pretend 
that  we  ought,  under  the  circumstances,  to  take 
part,  by  force,  on  her  side,  I  nevertheless  maintain 
that  we  are  under  the  highest  obligations  to  do 
everything  consistently  with  our  own  interest,  to 
relieve  Prance  from  danger  or  difficulty. 

At  a  later  period  in  our  history,  when  we  were 
at  war  with  England,  in  1812,  Russia  tendered 
her  mediation.  That  mediation  was,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  Mr.  Monroe,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
"  willingly  accepted"  by  our  Government.  Great 
Britain  declined  it,  but  subsequently,  and  after  she 
q*  had  triumphed  over  her  great  adversary  in  Europe, 
and  was  prepared  to  turn  all  her  forces  against 
the  United  States,  and  thus  give  the  war  a  much 
more  serious  and  formidable^haracter,  it  is  well 
known  that  the  interference  of  Alexander  of 
Russia  contributed ,  in  a  powerful  manner,  towards 
the  pacification  which  took  place.  Russia,  too, 
it  appears,  then,  has  strong  claims  to  any  good 
offices  we  can  render  her. 

Still  later  in  our  progress  as  a  nation  there  is 
an  incident,  and  a  precedent  more  striking  and 
conclusive  in  its  character.  In  1835,  when  this 
Government,  under  the  administration  of  General 
Jackson  was  in  imminent  danger  of  being  involved 
in  war  with  Prance,  Great  Britain  tendered  her 
mediation.    It  was  accepted,  both  by  us  and  by 


the  King  of  France,  and  a  pacification  between 
the  two  Governments  was  the  result.  Upon  this 
point  I  cannot  do  better  than  to  read  a  few  sen- 
tences from  the  work  of  the  distinguished  gentle- 
man from  Missouri,  [Mr.  Benton.]  After  allud- 
ing to  the  state  of  things  which  then  existed — the 
exhaustion  of  negotiations  and  the  preparatory 
armaments  on  both  sides,  he  refers  to  the  fact  that 
General  Jackson  sent  in  a  message  to  Congress, 
announcing  his  acceptance  of  the  mediation,  and 
uses  the  following  language: 

"  In  communicating  the  offer  of  the  British  mediation  the 
President  expressed  his  high  appreciation  of  the  '  elevated 
and  die-interested  motives  of  that  offer.'  The  motives 
were,  in  fact,  both  elevated  and  disinterested  ;  and  presents 
one  of  those  noble  spectacles  in  the  conduct  of  nations  on 
which  history  loves  to  dwell.  France  and  the  United  States 
had  fought  together  against  Great  Britain ;  now  Great  Britain 
steps  between  France  and  the  United  States  to  prevent  them 
from  fighting  each  other.  George  the  Third  received  the 
combined  attacks  of  French  and  Americans;  his  son,  Wil- 
liam the  Fourth,  interposes  to  prevent  their  arms  from  being 
turned  against  each  other.  It  was  a  noble  intervention,  and 
a  just  return  for  the  good  work  of  the  Emperor  Alexander 
in  offering  his  mediation  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain — good  works  these  peace  mediations,  and  as 
nearly  divineas  humanity  can  reach ; — worthy  of  all  praises 
of  long  rememberance,  and  continual  imitation  ; — the  more 
so  in  this  case  of  the  British  mediation  when  the  event  to 
be  prevented  would  have  been  so  favorable  to  British  inter- 
ests—would have  thrown  the  commerce  of  the  United 
States  and  of  France  into  her  hands,  and  enriched  her  at 
the  expense  of  both.  Happily  the  progress  of  the  age  which, 
in  cultivating  good  will  among  nations,  elevates  great 
Powers  above  all  selfishness,  and  permits  no  unfriendly 
recollection — no  selfish  calculation— to  balk  the  impulsions 
of  a  noble  philanthropy. 

These,  Mr.  Chairman,  are  just  and  noble  senti- 
ments in  themselves,  and  concisely  and  hand- 
somely expressed.  Andrew  Jackson,  then  at  the 
head  of  our  Government,  was  not  a  man  likely  to 
succumb  to  an  adversary,  or  to  admit  improper 
interference  from  a  foreign  quarter.  Nor  did  any 
man  in  these  Halls,  or  in  the  country,  censure 
his  acceptance  of  the  mediation.  Every  one  knew 
that  that  iron  will,  before  which  the  veteran  col- 
umns of  England  were  broken  to  pieces  at  New 
Orleans,  would  have  been  not  less  strikingly  ex- 
hibited in  defense  of  any  right  that  could  claim 
the  protection  of  our  flag. 

It  thus  appears  that  each  one  of  these  three  great 
Powers  has,  in  periods  of  trial  or  danger  to  us, 
interfered  for  our  relief;  and  shall  we  not  recipro- 
cate their  good  offices  ?  Shall  we  be  always  readv 
to  receive  benefits,  and  never  to  return  them  ?  Shall 
we  fold  our  arms,  and  coolly  look  on,  while  our 
former  friends  are  struggling  in  the  midst  of  perils? 
Above  all,  shall  we  refuse  to  act  because  we  hope 
to  take  benefits  from  their  misfortunes  ?  Is  a  great 
Government  like  ours  to  occupy  the  position  of 
the  wrecker,  who  stands  upon  the  sea-beach  during 
the  storm,  praying  that  navies  may  be  strained, 
that  he  may  seize  upon  the  floating  fragments^ 
Shall  we  imitate  the  kite  and  the  vulture  that  fol; 
low  armies  to  prey  upon  the  slain,  or  the  sharks 
that  collect  around  the  sinking  ship  to  devour  the 
drowning  inmates?  If  any  gentleman  here  haa 
such  feelings,  I  envy  him  not  their  enjoyment. 

If  we  were,  as  a  nation,  too  feeble  to  protect 
ourselves,  we  might,  upon  the  plea  of  necessity, 
justify  being  thus  contemptible.  We  might  then 
have  an  excuse  for  wishing  that  others  might  be 
crippled  lest  they  should  hurt  us.  But  while  in 
a  war  with  any  great  maritime  Power  our  com- 
merce would  seriously  suffer,  there  is  no  nation  in 
less  danger  of  conquest  or  mutilation.    We  can, 


A 


> 
i 


8 


LIBRARY  OF  CONGRESS   *n 


0  029  977  762  5 


therefore,  afford  to  be  just  and  honorable,  yea,  even 
magnanimous. 

There  is  another  reason,  Mr.  Chairman,  which 
operates  with  great  force  on  my  mind  as  an  argu- 
ment for  my  proposition.  The  impression  pre- 
vails in  Europe,  or,  at  all  events,  has  been  sought 
to  be  created  there,  that  we  are  a  grasping  and  a 
rapacious  people.  I  do  not,  for  a  moment,  admit 
the  justice  of  this  charge  against  us.  On  the  con- 
trary, I  think  the  United  States  have  shown,  from 
their  earliest  history,  a  commendable  moderation. 
I  recollect  very  well  being  told  by  a  gentleman 
who  had  just  returned  from  Europe,  whilst  the 
Texas  annexation  was  pending,  that  the  veteran 
statesman  Metternich  said  to  him,  there  was  not 
a  Government  in  Europe  that  would  have  hesi- 
tated a  moment  to  take  Texas  on  the  terms  on 
which  she  offered  herself.  In  fact,  while  England 
has  been  taking  kingdom  after  kingdom  in  Asia, 
and  France  has  been  extending  her  conquests  over 
Africa,  and  the  other  European  Governments  have 
been  taking  all  the  territory  they  could  acquire 
without  peril  to  themselves,  we  may  well  chal- 
lenge a  comparison  with  thein. 

I  may  say,  further,  in  order  that  no  gentle- 
man may  misunderstand  the  feelings  with  which 
I  make  these  remarks,  that  I  belong  to  what  is 
called  the  party  of  progress,  or  to  Young  America. 
I  am  in  favor  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  under 
proper  circumstances.  Nevertheless,  while  I  en- 
tertain these  opinions,  and  believe  that  injustice 
has  been  done  to  our  country  abroad,  it  is  im- 
possible to  conceal  the  fact  that  the  impression 
prevails  in  Europe  that  we  desire  this  war  to 
continue,  in  order  that  we  may  get  an  opportunity 
to  seize  upon  our  neighbor's  territory.  Now,  by 
making  this  movement  we  shall  truthfully,  and  at 
the  same  time,  gracefully  remove  any  such  im- 
pression. Besides,  sir,  it  would  be  a  declaration 
of  neutrality  in  the  most  emphatic  form .  It  would 
not  only  be  a  declaration  that  our  Government 
intended  to  stand  neutral,  but  that  it  did  not  de3ire 
that  the  war  should  continue  to  the  injury  of  the 
parties  themselves.  If  the  movement  were  to  be 
successful — if  we  were  to  be  instrumental  in 
relieving  these  belligerents  from  their  present  diffi- 
culties, it  would  give  us  the  greatest  consideration, 
not  only  with  the  Governments,  but  also  with  the 
masses  of  the  people. 

I  maintain  that  if  our  country  and  its  Govern- 
ment becomes  popular  with  the  people  of  Great 
Britain  and  France,  and  with  the  other  nations 
of  Europe,  the  monarchs  would  not  like  to  quarrel 
with  us  in  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  their  sub- 
jects. But  where  there  is  ill-feeling  between  coun- 
tries, a  single  spark  will  sometimes  light  the  flames 
of  war, 


I  have,  Mr.  Chairman,  discussed  this  question 
mainly  upon  the  narrow  ground  of  our  interests 
as  a  nation.  This,  however,  is  not  the  mode  to 
do  full  justice  to  the  subject.  To  do  this  will  re- 
quire a  much  wider  range  of  thought  and  inves- 
tigation. Independently  of  all  calculations  of 
interest,  considerations  of  humanity  rise  up  and 
force  themselves  upon  the  mind.  The  earth  waB 
given  to  man  for  his  dominion  and  control.  But 
it  is  only  in  our  times  that  men  are  beginning  to 
assert  that  right  in  its  full  extent.  I  do  not  mean 
to  say  that  in  former  ages  men  have  not  been 
spread  over  the  earth,  but  it  is  only  in  our  day  that 
they  have  begun  to  turn  its  great  natural  agents 
to  account.  This  war  will  stop  the  progress  of 
humanity.  It  will  destroy  the  greatest  and  beat 
works  of  man,  and  throw  him  back  upon  the  bar- 
barism of  the  past. 

Besides,  it  is  a  war  between  th  e  differentbranches 
of  the  great  Caucasian  family — the  white  races  of 
men,  who  have  shown  by  their  superior  mental 
and  moral  endowments,  their  right  to  control  the 
world  and  regulate  its  destinies.  It  is  also  a 
war,  in  the  main,  between  Christian  nations;  and 
we  are  impelled,  therefore,  by  considerations  of 
humanity,  of  race,  and  of  religion,  to  interpose, 
if  our  interposition  can  avail  anything.  If  the 
movement  is  to  be  made,  it  should  begin  here. 
We  represent  the  feelings,  the  very  heart  of  the 
American  people;  hence  our  sanction  will  give 
greater  force  and  consideration  to  the  movement. 
But  to  the  Executive,  who  has  the  charge  of 
conducting  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  country,  it 
belongs  properly  to  decide  when  and  how  the 
step  should  be  taken.  If  there  be  not  a  fitting 
occasion  just  now,  it  may  be  otherwise  a  few 
months  hence. 

Entertaining  these  feelings,  my  original  object 
was  to  bring  the  subject  before  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs,  and  let  that  committee  determine 
whether  such  a  movement  was  advisable;  if  it 
were,  to  let  it  begin  with  Congress,  but  leave  to 
the  Executive  the  mode  and  manner  of  conducting 
it.  The  President,  of  course,  has  an  acquaintance 
with  the  condition  of  things  which  nobody  else 
can  possess,  and  to  him,  therefore,  would  I  leave 
it  to  determine  whether  the  movement  should  be 
made  now  or  at  some  future  day,  and  whether  the 
offer  of  mediation  should  be  tendered  through  the 
foreign  ministers  here  or  through  our  ministers 
abroad,  or  in  any  other  mode  that  he  might  regard 
as  best  calculated  to  effect  the  object.  Whenever 
he  should  think  proper  to  act,  he  would  then  move 
in  the  matter  with  all  the  authority  of  the  Gov- 
ernment to  sustain  him..  If  the  movement  shall 
be  made,  I  have  no  doubt  but  that  it  would  be 
sanctioned  and  approved  by  our  constituents. 


Printed  at  tbe  Congressional  Globe  Office. 


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